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By letter of 29 June r98I the Committee on External Economic
Relations requested authorization to draw up a report on the
significance of economic sanctions, particularly trade embargoes
and boycotts, and their consequences for the EEC's external
relations 
"
BY letter of 28 SePtember 198I
Parliament authorized the committee
subject. The Committee on Economic
on 28 September 1981, to deliver an
The oPinion of
is to be published
t,he President of the EuroPean
to draw uP a rePort on this
and Monetary Affairs was asked,
opinion.
on 20 october 1981 the Committee on External Economic
Relations appointed l{r Seeler rapPorteur'
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of
27 October 1981, 23 February Lg82 and 31 March L982 and adopted
the motion for a resolution and explanatory statement at the
latter meet,ing by L4 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions "
The following took part in the votes
Sir Fred Catherwood, chaj-rman; I"[r van Aerssen and Ir4r SeaI' vice-
chaj.rmen, Mf seeler, rapporteur; Mr Alavanos, Mrs Baduel GlOriOSO,
Mr Bonaccini (deputrzing for Mrs Poirier) ' Lord Harmar-Nicholls(deputizing for sir Fred warner), Mr Mommersteeg, Mrs L" Moreau'
Lord Oot-Iagan, Mrs Phlix (deputizing for Mr Jonker), Ivlrs Pruvot'
lvlr R.ieger, Mr Rogers (deputizing for Mr Radoux), Mr SteIIa and
It{r Welsh.
the committee on Econcnic and Monetary Affairs
separatelY 
"
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'lhe Committee
:he Buropean
:ogether with
A
on External Economic Relations hereb,
Parliament the following motion for a
explanaL<.rry statement :
:'':bmi;-s to
:e sol tru illrr
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
)n the significance of economic sanctions, particurariy -trade
-'mbargoes and boycotts, and their consequences f or Lhe EEC,s
.'elations with third countries.
l!s. European Parliament,
las, i n formulating t.he measures contained in para.-r.ipi:is 
-r* g
>elow, been guided by the following consicieratrons:
,a) trade embargoes and hoycotts are sanctions reccgnizeri in
rnternational lavl,
economic sanctions have a history of failuren
,c) economie sanctions have proved to b,e thorouqhly unsaLisfac,tory
as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives,
(d) hardly any state can be induced by economi,: f,. -.ri-, l_-,
radicar changes in its policies. such pressLr].(: 
-Ls :,,tr,.- ir
more likery to resurt in the hardening of poJ-.r' 
-L-31 --,Li.i L:..1:,-
while the nationar economies of the state imi:os:_ng sanct_,_ r,-r
and of third countries not directly invorved aj.d \/€ry otaun
as seriously af fected and badly damaged as tjle natio;-r4f economi,,
of the state on which sanctions have been im;-,,-=,^ r
,e) there are many ways of circumventing and unclerrrrinirrg ecoi)olrtlc
sanctions" Hor,,rever st.ringentJ-y they are poJ.:^.-rl, ir_ is
impossible to guarantee that they are implement-ed absolui -1.,.
consistentry and without exception, at reast in peace-time,
for sanctions to be ef fective, the stat,e on whjch t.hey are
-Lmposed must be dependent on the import and export of the
boycotted goods and services, and must be unabfe-or at l_east,
fail-to reduce its need for such goods and services or Lo
find substitutes for t,hem,
b)
f)
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(,J) Lhe effects <>f sanct-rons - Lhe drsrr:FrLjon ttf Lr.rrie, the .l r:ss
of n,arkets, the ti)reat to the economic survival of f irms and
undertakings, 4nd hence to jobs - often infLict financi.rl
losses and irreparable economic damage on a scalc ou1 of all
profortion to the desired or possible economj.c objectives,
(h) economic sanctions often have the effect of ratrying the
people of the state subjected to them around their country
and their government, creating a surge of solidarity which
would not otherwise have been possible and enabling the
state to greatly reduce its dependence on international trade
by such means as increased industrialization or more intensive
Iarming" Thus sanctions can often eventualJ_y strengthen,
rath:r than weaken, the position of the state on which t-hey
are imposed,
(i) econ >mic sanctions can have
to c:eate a mood of national
ofte r lead to public support
take r within certain Iimits
1;oI j-': ical opponents ,
a powerful emotional impact, helping
emergency. This may in t,urn very
for preventive measures being
by the government against its
, i.c E-urop(lan parliamen!
r'IVjnq r€Jard to these f indings and considerations, and to the report
)f t.he Cor rmittee on External Economic Relations and the opinion of the
lonrnittee ort Econcrnic and rylonetary Affairs (Ooc. L-83/82), decides as follcnss:
The tlommission and the councir are urged not to impose or
asso( iate themserves with any generar and hence, in practice,
unenl orceable economic sanctions;
) If tl e imposition of economic sanctions becomes necessary on politicaL
gto,ri d", such sanctions should focus on specific selective neasures and
carefrtI consideration should be given to ttre prospects of tkreir being successfully
enforr:ed and to their possi-ble consequences;
such sanctions directed at specific areas of the economy
shoulc, however, be used very sparingry; if such sanctions
^r(: c:cided upon by the institutions of the European community,howev:r, the forrowing principres should be observed:
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Lhe sanctions should
areas of the economy
allies have a strong
or diamonds, 'hardo
technologY]. ,
be concentrated on precisely defined
and products in which the EC and its
market position (e.g. markets for gold
curr?ency loans and highIy specialized
4.
financial measures, particularly with regard to 'hardl
currency loans, must be organized in conjunction with fin-
ancia]. and monetary centres outside the Community,
- the necessary measures must be introduced and implemented
both swiftlY and vigorouslY,
- exemptions must be almost comPletely ruled out'
the unconditional support and fu1I cooperation of aII the
EEC Member States and other countries involved in the
imposition of sanctions must be established before any \
such measures are taken, and ensured for as long as s;rnel-jons
are in force by the prolnpt and detailed exchange of itrtorntallon,
- efforts must be macle to ensure that the economic losses and
darnage incurred as a result of the impositron of sanctions
are borne in equal measure by al} the states and national
economies invo.lved,
AII sanctions motivated by the race or religion of natural or
Iegal persons are to be condemned on principle and aII national
and economic institutions are urged to refrain from doing any-
thing which could encourage or facititate the imposition of such
sanct.ions;
The council and the commission must Press for the inclusion of
a non-discrimination clause analogous to that included in the
Community, s cooperation agreements with the l"laghreb and Mashreq
states in any negotiations on trade and cooperation agreements
or financial protocols with third countries'
The council and the commission should, when pursuing such pol-
itical objectives as t.he elimination of racial discrimination
throughout the world, exert stronger pressure on European firms
working and investing in other countries, for example South
5.
6.
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differentials based on race or sex'
- make strenuous efforts to improve the rights of those
workers who are subject to racial discrimination'
Africa, to observe the
abolish any internal
refrain from any PaY
The Commission is urged to draw
policY towards st'ates whose PoI
to the EC, and which therefore
their Policies;
EC Code of Conduct and
racial or religious discrimination'
7. up guidelines for commercialitical actions are unaccePtable
ought to be induced to change
S.ItsPresidentisinstructedtoforwardthisresolutionandthe
reportofthecommitteetotheCouncilandtheCommission,the
parliaments of the Member States and i:he Foreign lvlinisters of
theMemberStatesmeetinginpoliticalcooperation.
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gXPLINATORY STATEM
r. 9e!rsi!ies-e!-lerue
l.Thetermssanction,embargoandboycottareoftenconfused
and used interchangeably. It should be noted that 'trade sanctions
is a general term coveringembargoes,boycotts and blockades' AlI
are measures intended to achieve political and economic objectives
by forcing other states or their governments to take, oE refrain
from, eertain actions. Ilistory Provides countless examples
of sanctions of this kind: the 'Continental Systemr or btockade
of the uK by France under Napoleon, the sea blockade against
thecentra}PowersbytheAlliesintheFirstWorldWar,the
League of Nations sanctions against ltaly during the Abyssinian
war,andtheUNembargoimposedonthePeopletsRepublicof
China and North Korea during the Korean war'
a ) 
-seEefgg
2. An embargo can be defined as a foreign trade restriction
orderedbyoneormorestates,generallyintheformofabanon
trade with one or more states or with persons or firms operating
on the economic territory of this or these states' The purpose
ofanembargoistoinducethe.target'stateorstatestotake
or refrain from a specific political course. The embargo is
thereforeaninstrumentofforeignpolicy'astheresultofan
initiative at national levet. Economic relations with one or
morestatesaretherebybrokenoffforpoliticalreasons.
i\ny enrbarqo is an agressive variant of international econcrnic Policv'
intendedtointroducedetiberatediscrirninationintoeconcrrrictransactions.
Its puq:ose is to damage tlre econcrny of anotkrer state iI order to pressure
it into changing its political behaviour' It inplies ttrat the furposing state
is prepared to suffer darnage to its olm econcrfl}z in "onseqoe,,.e.}
1
'Detlev Christian Dicke: Die Intervention mit wirtschaftlichen
Mitteln i*-v6i[;rrecht (intervention by economic- means in
international law), gaden-gaden Lg7L, ind RoIf Hesse: Theorie
und politik des Embargos (The embargo, theory and policy) '
Cologne I973.
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3.Embargoesfallintofourcategories:exportembargoes,
import emharooos, r'lPital t-ransaction and financial
embarqoes, 6nd srntrargpes on transport services'
These can be subdivided further into partial embargoes, which affect
only one or two sectors of the econo[I[r and total embargoes'
partial embargoes can be broken down, in turn, into quota
embargoes-which impose specific quantitative limits on trade-and
selective embargoes, which only affect specific items. Total
embargoes can be broken down into total trade embargoes, in which
imports and exports are suspended, and total embargoes ProPer, jn
which iff trade is broken off.
b) 9eYee!!
4. A boycott is not to be confused with a trade embargo. A id
boycott can be aPplied to any aspect of social, cultural and
economic life at natioaal or internat,ional level, and is therefore
much broader in scope than an embargo. The boycott and the embargo
have certain features in common: their aim is economic discrimination
against, and damage Eo, a specific third party to force that party
to take or refrain from certain actions. The crucial difference
between an embargo and a trade boycott is the fact that the former
is imposed by the state. An embargo is a matter of national policy,
a measure taken by the state, whereas a boycott can be conducted by
private individuals, firms, unions etc., acting on their own
initiative in rhe exercise of their rights of free association and
the freedom to enter into contracts" e
Nevertheless it is common usage, in the context of international
relations, to refer to the economic sanctions imposed on one state
by another.as a boycott. The terminological distinction between
the two concePts is not always very precise.
5. There are three kinds of boycott: the primary b-oycott aims
to prevent the citizens of a country from engaging in business
with the citizens of another country, whether directly or indirectly.
A secondjlry boJcot!, on the other hand, means the extension of trade
restrictions to third countries or persons not directly involved
in the dispute. One such exampj-e is the trade boycott imposed by
Arab states on firms and businessmen in third states who engage
in business with Israeli citizens.
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a 
-tsr_!iary_boIse!! is
that do business with
boycott, 
€.9. are on
in turn, do business
c) Blockade
directed against natural or legal persons
firms which are the targets of a secondary
the Arab Leaguets 'black list' because they,
with Israeli firms.
6. A blocka-de is not to be confused with an embargo or a boycott.
The regar concept of the blockade derives from an act of sea
warfare which entairs cutting off access to the enemy,s coasts
by means of warships: this permits the blockading state to control
the shipment of goods outside its oh,n territoriar waters. rn
time of war, the imposition of a brockade can bring an enemy,s
foreign trade to a complete standstiLl.
II. Ibe- legcl 
_ 
g!elss 
_e!_ eels!rgls
7. The embafgo, the boycott and the blockade are sanctions
recognized in internationar raw. The charter of the League of
Nations provided (Artic1es 16 and 17) that aII member states of
the League should immediatery break off arr state and private
economic and financial relations with any state, or national.s of
a state, which had infringed the charter of the League by
going to war, regardress of whether the state was a member.
Since mandatory provisions of this kind proved to be unworkable
in practice, and the sanctions imposed by the League seldom
achieved the desired results, the Charter of the United Nations
preferred a more cautious formura. under Article 4r of the uN
Charter, where a breach of the Charter has led to war or the threat
of war the security councir can oblige all members of the uN to
impose mandatory economic sanctions against the offending state.
rn practice, however, this rure has never been applied up to now.
The embargo imposed on Albania and Bulgaria in 1949 was recommended
by the General Assembly, not the security council" The same applies
to the recommendation that an embargo shourd be imposed on the
Peopre's Republic of china and North Korea, during the Korean hrar.
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f. iconomic sanctions are instruments of foreign policy and
economic policy. As an institution acknowledged in international
Iaw, sanctions are to be interpreted either as an act of reprisal
or a gesture of solidarity with international organizations
or alliances. Economic sanctions work - or are intended to work
by the withdrawal of goods and services, which has the effect
of fonrcing the target country to seek alternative supplies,
provoking structural change, and exacerbating unemployment and
inflation" They are also intended to affect production by
producing a shortage of raw materials and spare parts, and causing
important machines and plant to be idle as a result.
g. one of the main justifications for the admissibility of the
embargo and the boycotL in international law is the principle of
r:he freedom to enter into contracts. It follows from the concept
of state sovereignty that a state has the right to enter or
refrain from entering into trade or supply contracts. The same
right is available to every citizen and every legal Person. But
it also follows from this right that embargoes and boycotts imposed
in peace-time should not affect existing contractual commitments.
So, for example, the US went ahead with its previously agreed
grain deliveries to the USSR in spite of the grain embargo it haa
imposed on that country after its invasion of Afghanistan.
10. seeonrlary and tertiary boycotts directed against natural or
legal persons n<'rt direetlrl involved in disout-es whi.ch have religious,
racial or other origins are of particular interest. A few states have
introduced laws expressly prohibiting boycotts of this kind. For
example, the US Export Adrninistration Amendments of L977, which
became law on 22 June L977, tightended up the anti-boycott
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969. This prohibits
practically aIl acts and practices which could serve to implement
or support the Arab States' secondary and tertiary boycott" France
passed a law against economic boycotts in L977. This law
prohibits any discrimination on grounds of race, religion or
nationality which leads to the disrupt5-on of economic activities.
The law has little or no practical effect, however, because of
another provision that such action is not punishable if it is
the result of government instruct.ions. The British attempt to
bring in legislation on the subject foundered when the Foreign
Boycotts Bill L978 failed to get through all its parriamentary
stages.
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I1. The
boycotts
(a)
EurOpean Community's response t.o secondary and tertiary
has been threefold;
The cooperation agreements with the Maghreb and it'lashreq
countries includes a non-discrimination clause whichn if
strictly applied, prohibits both sides frorn eonducting
secondary or tertiary boycotts. Flowever the Maghreb
states, in an exchange of letters, weakened uhis clause
by claiming that laws which had entered int'o force
before the agreement was signed, and matters considered
vital to the security interests of the states invoLved,
were not affected by it. A similar fate befelL the
equivalent provisions of the cooperai:ion aEreemnents tvit'h'
the Mashreq countries, It s[ou]-d be noted, ltowever,
that the obligation placed on both sj.des hy t.he non-
discrimination clause cannot be waived by unilat'eral
statements by either party" The derogation in favour
of protecting national security interests echoes
Article 2L of the GATT agreement. Butn apar€ from t'his
proviso, the Arab signatories to these agreement,s Carlflotr
in effect, conduct secondary boycotts against any Persons
or firms in the EC states. The financial protocols
coneluded with the Mahgreb and Mashreq countries al-so
expressly state that participation as regards projects
and measures financed by the community'shalL be open
on equat terms to all natural- and leEal persons'of the
states PartY to the agreements"
(b) AIso, the EC has invoked the competition rules of the
EEC Treaty against such cases of boycott" The Commission
has always taken the view that the rules contained in
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty prohJ-bit. the imposition
of any kind of boycott or other discrimination by t'hird
countries on European firms or citizens on grounds of
race, religion or nationalitY'
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(c) The Commission is also endeavouring to count.er
boycotts of this kind by the applicat.ion of tshe
Treaty rules regarding the harmonization of leEislation"
The Commission is anxious to afford European c:-tizens
and firms greater protection against such boyeotts by
introducing Ec directives to hring the great variety
of nationar provisions into aliEnmesrt. one of it.s
principal concerns is tr: prevent third c,run.i:ri.es f,rom
singj.ing out for boycotts the Memb,er state c,r states
whose j.egislation is least restricti-ve j-n thj-s atrea.
L2" Neutral states are in a special posiLion in so.far asi Ltrre
legal status of sanctj-ons is concerned." Their neutral sta,tus
in international law reqr:ires them to refraj"n from tal'"ing sj.des
in internationaL conf licts. Their colnmerciar oolicy toivarels
other states must be based on Lhe principJ-e of'business as usuaLi.
Their neutrar status does not oblige them,on i:he other hand, to
step up their t.rade with a nation which is suhject to an embarEo or
other sanctions in order to counteract the eff,ects of, such sanct.i.ons.
But in fact neutral states often become the focus of ,sancti.on-
busting! operations, since trading companies in these states
are subject t,o no geographical restrictions and rittre or no
control. I\toviradays as in the past,, sanctions present rieutral
states with a Ereat temptation to draw benefit for t.l.irennseLves and
their eeonomies f rom other countriesu mut,uaL disagreernenLs. Many
examples could be quoted of neut.ral stat,es profiting c*:nsiderably
from siLuationsof this kind.
To sum up, embargoes and boycotts are, legitimate
sanctions in international 1aw, subject to the reserva,tions rnentioned
above. But before drawing any conclnsions for i:tre connnrercial
policy of the European community, we should first consider eight
important eases of sanctions which the EC was dlrectly or indi-rect.Iy
involved in imposing, or by which it has been aff,ected.
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a) lbe-:PiPe-eBEeEse:
13. In 1963 the NATO Council unanimously decided that it would
henceforth cease to supply steel pipes to the USSR because such
pipes served strategic as weII as economic purposes, since they
could be used, among other things, to improve the supply of fuel
to the troops. The Council decision touchedrtherefore, on an
area already covered by the embargo on strategically important
products supervised by the coordinating committee for East-west
Trade PoIicY (COCOM).
As a result of the pipe embargo, the export of pipes, chiefly
from the Federal Republic of Germany, dropped from 255r400 tonnes i
1962 to 8,300 tonnes in 1964, dnd to nil by the end of 1966. But the ernbargo wa
underminedrprincipally by sweden and Japan. sweden's exports of
pipes to the USSR were:
L962
r963
1965
while Japan's were:
l-962
1965
7r000 tonnes
60,000 tonnes
48,300 tonnes,
14,300 tonnes
L42,000 tonnes.
The uK also ignored the pipe embargo, despite the unanimous
decision by the NATO Council. The uK did not pick up any extra
orders, however-
14. The ussR reacted to this embargo by converting the piperines
it- was constructing to larger-gauge pipes, which it began to
produce itself in greater quantities. stepping up the production
of pipes imposed a strain on the supply of raw materials and led
to increasing shortages in other sectors of industry such as
mechanical engineering. It also noticeably slowed down the rate
of pipeline construction thus delaying the development of the oil
and gas industry and the construction of irrigation works ' There
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was no significant reaction from the USSR, however. The exercise
demonstrated that a specific embargo of this kind is pointl'ess,
particularly if the states imposing it show a lack of solidarity.
The brunt of the NATO decision was borne by the Federal Republic
of Germany and some of those who spoke of the need to protect
the strategic interests of the Alliance were much more concerned
with protecting themselves against competit.Lon from that country
and, to an even greater extent, from the USSR, Elrr increasingly
significant exporter of energy. The pipe embargo was therefore
lifted at the end of 1966. The exPort cf pipes to the USSR was
resumed in the course of the following year.
The Arab bovcott of Israel
---a----
15. As early as L945 the Council of the Arab League launched
a permanent boycott of 'Zionist' goods and products. In 1951
the boycott was extended to third states in an effort to prevent
Ehem from supporting Israel. The anti-Israel boycott central
office i.n Damascus sought to give impetus to the boycott by
compiling so-ca1led 'black lists' of Western firms whose trade
with Israel was helping t,o develop the economic and military
potential of that country. This secondary boycott was accomPanied,
in some casesrby a tertiary boycott intended to restrain firms
from doing business with other firms which were on the black list.
After the Arab-Israeli war of L973 t,he Arab states stepped
up the boycott once again. The number of American firms black-
Iisted by the Damascus boycott office rose from 785 in L974 to
25,000 in L976.
16. The EC has taken no firm measures to put an end to this
boycott, apart from inserting the above-mentioned 'non-
discrimination' clauses in the cooperation agreements with the
Ivlahgreb and Mashreq countries, and continuing to insist on
the binding nature of the competition rules contained in Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Former Commissioner Cheysson,
addressing the European Parliament on behalf of the Commission
on 15 Inlay L975, declared that the boycott ran counter to the spirit
b)
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and prineiples of the cooperation which the Community was
endeavouring to establish with the Arab states. The Commission
arso announced that it would take firm action on every case
of discrimination reported to it by the Member states or their
firms, undertakings or private citizens. The commission has
not so far received any complaints about the effects of t.he boycott.
L7. In fact the Arab boycott against Israel has been weakened to
a considerable extent. This is due to the fact that the Arab
League had drawn up only an outline agreement on how the boycott
was to be operated; each member state was left to pass a law of
its own containing more detaired provisions. self-interest
and pragmatism tended to prevail over anti-Zionist ideo-logy since
Arab businessmen were often reluctant to stop doing business with
firms which were arso doing business with rsrael. coca-cora,
Xerox, Ford and various big hoteL chains and airlines feII into
t.tris category.
In L978, Kuwait was the first Arab teague state to remove some
of t-he restri.ctions on trade with the USA. Kuwait decided that
in future it would no ronger require proof that a firm had no
business relations with rsrael, not least because no sr:ch proof
could be forthcoming without the active cooperation of the public
authorities in the other state. Experience shows that th.r Arab
boycott of Israel can only be implemented if the industriali-zed
countrjes' public authorities or chambers of commeree actively
cooperate in j.t. But if , for example, chambers of commerce are
reticent about so-carled 'rsrael clauses, and refuse to accept
discriminatory crauses in business documents, it is armost
impossible for an Arab state to find out which firms do business
with rsrael or might be liabre to a secondary or tertiary
boycott for other reasons.
c) The eE!ersg- rspe ggq_gl_BbeCe e I c
18" In 1953 Great Britain, acting against the wishes of the black
po1-ruration, formed a federation from the three protectorates
of Nor:thern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. ft was
only in Southern Rhodesia that the White minority succeeded in
holding on to por,{er. Nyasaland become independent on 6 JuIy
1964. and Northern Rhodesia on 24 October L964; Southern Rtrodesia refused to conply
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with tlrr.,British C:overrurent's demand for a majority-i.e. preponderantly B1ack -
government, and made its Unilateral Declaration of Lndependence
on I November 1965, after Winston Field had been replaced as
Prime l"linister by Ian Smith. Britain reacted by imposing
economic and financial sanctions which did not, however, achieve
their purpose, since Rhodesia began to lean increasingly on
South Africa, which had withdrawn from the Commonwealth on
31 May 195I and naturally suPported the White minority r6gime"
19. Immediately after Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of
independence, the UN Security Council condemned this action and
on 20 November it passed Resolutions calling on a'L states to
break off economic relations with Rhodesia and to impose an
embargo in respect of oil and oil products $/Res/?L6 of 12.11.1955;
S/Rcsrr2U of 20.II.1965). These Resolutions were not binding,
howcver; it was not until the end of 1955 that the security
Council, under pressure from Britain, imposed selective mandatory
sanctions on Rhodesia, after negotiations between Britain and
i!= colony to find an acceptable solution had foundered. The UN
s.rnctions prohibited member states from importin'; into their own
territory Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chromium, Pi9 iron,
sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides and leather;
the transport of such products, and any action to further trade
in them, was also forbidden. UN states l^'ere alsc required to
prevent the export to Rhodesia of military equiPment, motor
vehir:1,c:s and aircraf t.
20. When it became apparent that these measures were having no
cffecL, the Security Council launched a fuII-scale embargo.
No more transfers of funds or capital to Rhodesia were to be
aIlc.rwc<1 (S/253 of 29.5.I968), although exceptions on humanitarian
grouncls were to be permissible. In Resolution 333, the Security
Council drcw member States' attention to the fact that certain
of thenr were not complying with their obligations under Article 25
of the UN Charter; South Africa and Portugal l^rere steadfastly
refusing to cooperate with the UN to enable the implementation
of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to be supervised effectively
(Resolution 333 of 22.5.I973). The Security Council urged member
states to comply with their legal obligations and to take action
against natural or legal persons who sought to evade the economic
sanctions imposed by the UN.
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2L. The imprementation of the Resorutions of Lg66 and lg6g by
the community of 'the six' varied both from the point of view
of timing and that of the method chosen; some states used
existing import and export rules (France, Germany the Netherlands),
another incorporated the Resolutions into domestic raw (rtary)r
while the rest applied both methods (Belgian-Luxembourg Economic
Union ) .
22" This situation gave countries the opportunity of avoiding
the imposition of sanctions via the Community's internaL market
since no uniform measure had yet been introduced; whereas ltaly
had immediatery imposed sanctions on payments, for exampr€, it
was five years before the Netherlands passed legislation to this
effect.
23" The accession of Britain to the EEC did not raise problems.
As a British colony in a state of rebelrion, Rhodesia was not
included among the countries listed in Annex IV to the EEC Treaty
(which is a list of overseas countries and territories to which
the provisions of Part rv of the Treaty appry : oJ L 73/Lg, l-gTgl .
In November, L979, the British Government brought the embargo
to an end by the passing of the southern Rhodesia Act. The
SouEhern Rhodesia Sanctions (Amnesty) Order was passed in May 19g0.
This measure could make it difficult for the British government to
apply economic sanctions effectivery in future, however, since
an amnesty of this kind guarantees British firms and citizens
freedom from prosecution in connection with past offences against
sanctions legislation.
24. The purpose of the embargo imposed by the uN was to bring
down Ian Smith's White r6gime and bring about the self-determination
of the zimbabwean peopre. rn practice, however, this embargo
was a fairure. south Africa and portugar, with its colonies
of Angora and Mozambique, suppried Rhodesia with necessities
and channelled Rhodesian exports through their ports. Switzerland,
as a non-member of the uN, arso took no part in the embargo.
she did, however, consent not to increase the vorume of her
trade with Rhodesia beyong the average level of the years before
the embargo.
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25. The most vulnerable sector of the Rhodesian economy was
energy, particularly oil supplies. But big Oil companies
like Bp and shell broke the embargo by delivering oil via south
Africa, partly by means of a 'swap' arrangement with the French
oil compdny, Total. One important effect of the embargo;
however, was that Rhodesia made strenuous and successful efforts
to reduce her dependence on imports of essential products.
Rhodesia eventually succeeded in achieving the second highest
Ievel of industrial development of any African state, after
South Africa. By the end of the fifteen years which sanctions
Iasted the country was producing 80t of all the industrial
products it needed itself. The GNP increased at an average
annual rate of 68 in real terms from 1965 to L975, while the
number of employed persons rose over this Period from 748r000
to I.l million. Rhodesia provided an increasing number of
jobs to migrant workers from neighbouring states. It was
only with the recession ( from L9751 , together uith the escalating
civrl war and finally the closing of Zambia's and Mozambique's
borders with Rhodesia (in 1973 and 1975), that the development
of the Rhodesian economy was slowed down. The country's GNP
and number of jobs fell in the years after L975.
26. The main reason fot the failure of the UN embargo against
Rhodesia was the fact that Rhodesia was not dependent on foreign
trade, except for the sUpply of oil. Several of its neighbours
were, o0 the other hand, dependent on trade with Rhodesia to
a considerable degree, and were not therefore interested in
reducing this trade, much less in bringing it to a halt.
Rhodesia also has supplies of valuable and scarce raw materials:
chromium, asbestos, nickel, graphite. The loss of Rhodesian
exports of t.hese commodities damaged the economy of many countries
involved in the embargo, and led to sanction-breaking. Finally
Rhodesia had an efficient agricultural sector, which was capable
of producing enough food for the population. Added to this
was the fact that Rhodesia had sufficient time to adapt to
the embargo. The UN Security Council took 13 months to decide
on a selective embargo and 17 months to launch a total embargo.
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Many states took several months more Eo implement t.he Security
Council's Resolution, and a n'rmber of states did not fuli'y comply
with the Lerms of t.he enrbargo. Aust,ralia continued to supply wheat
to Rhodesia, for exa.mple, iustifyinE this action by reference to
the humanitarian grounds mentioned in the Security Council Reso.l-urt,iot
while the US and West Germany (which was not yet a member of th.e Ut'{
and hence was not bound by the decisions of the Security Council)
referrecl to existing contracts in justifying their failure to break
off trade relations abruptly, although such action rsas spec5-fieally
ruled out by the Security Council Resolution. tloreover t'he system
of supervising the implementation of t.he embargo was ineffective,
and there was no provisj.on for the equalization of the eeonomic
burden to be borne by member statesr oE for support for countries
which were particularly severely affected' It was onJ-y at a
very late stage that aid was granted to Rhodesia's neighbours,
Zambia and Mozambique, in order to persuade thern to close their
borders with Rhodesia in the interests of the embargo, and cease
trading with that country.
d) The 
- 
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27. After the storming of the American Embassy in Teheran by a
band of Iranian revolutionaries on 4 November L979 the 'b'hcn
President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, announced on 7
April I98O - after all attempts to free the hostages had failed
that various sanctions, including a trade embargo, would be
imposed on Tran.
It was only after strst.rined pressure from the US A&ninistration that 
,
the Member States of the European Community, acting in the eontex''t:
of European PoIiticaI Cooperation, accepted a two-stage plan fr:r
sanctions, ds follows:
- The first stage consisted of diplomatic sanctions
including a reduction of the staff of the Teheran
embassies of the EC states, and a correspondinE
reduction of the number of Iranian dipJ-omats accredj-ted
to European capitals, the introduction of a visa
requirement for Tranians wishing to travel to EC
countries, and a ban on the conclusion of new export
contracts and arms saIes,
2t pE 77 "Og5/f:-n"
if the hostages werc not released at an early date, the
second stage would corne inLc operat.ion with the imposition
of more comprehensive economic sanctions.
28- on l7 April 1980, t-he European Parliament adopted a resoLltion
calling on the governnrents of:he Member states to break off
diplomatic relaE.ions wiEh rran if t.he American hostages were not
released.
The second sLage of the communi-tyos plan of action was
set in train on 18 May 1980. However, the sanctions onry appti.ed
to contract.s which had been concluded after 4 November LgTg and
exemptions were made for foodstuffs and medicinar products.
The release of the hostages early in January r9g1 was
foLlowed by the lifting of sanctions against Iran.
29" Apart from the signiticance of the Community's solidarity with
the US as a political gesture, the European sanctions had little
effect. Community exports to rran rose in the period from January
to i{ay 1980 by 1068, from 760 nrillion to L,562 mirrion units of
account. In particular t,he Netherlands, Britain, France and
Belgium increased their exports over this period by more than
1008 compared to the previous year. one reason for t.his increase
was certainry the expectation at the beginning of 19go that
an embargo would be impose,I. !-rrrns were anxious to transact as
much as possible of the business t.hey had already arranged wj-th
fran 
"
30. After the embargo had }-leen introduced, in the period from
June to September 1980, EC exports to Iran did not rise significanlys
the rate of increase was 9.4E from I,507,200,000 to !r649r5OOrO0O
units of aecount. one reason for this increase was that so-ca11ed
long-standing contracLs, those that had been concluded before
4 November L979, were not covereci by the embargor and that t,here
were no restrictions on the export of food or medicaments" These
unrest.ricted items accounted for 32* of totar exports in the
second half of 1980, compared to 208 of the total in l-g7g.
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The export of agricultural products alone doubled in this
period by comparison with the figures for LgTg 
"
speciar export ricences were arso granted, however, in order
to alleviate the situation of firms affected by the embargo.
(These licences were restricted to the implementation of contracts
concruded between 5 November L979 and 24 May 1980, the day on
which the decision to impose t.he embargo was published).
31. The sright 5.mpact of the embargo is also explained by the
growth of 'backdoor' trade. For exampre, us exports to the Arab
Emirates in February 1980, when US trade sanctions against Iran
were first being discussed, rose by about usg 100 milrion.
However, circuitousry routed imports of this kind meant a
considerable rise in the price of such products for rran, which
had repercussions on that countryb arready strained foreign
exchange situation. Iran therefore made extensive efforts to
diversify its imports, and concluded agreements to this end with
the USSR, Romania, India and Turkey during this period.
32. Nor should it be overlooked that Iran continued to be in a
strong position as an oi1 supprier on the worrd market. Many
Vilestern states were still dependent on Iranian oil supplies at that
time. Nevertheless, even before the capture of the hostages,
rranrs oil exports had dropped considerabry by comparj.son with
earrier years as a result of revolutionary changes within the
country, so that the 'oir weaponr no 1onger posessed the immense
impact that it wourd have had a few years earrier. This emerges
clearly from the following figures:
The European community imported 97 mirrion tonnes of oi1 from
rran in L976, 78 mirrion tonnes in L977, 33.94 mirrion tonnes
in 1979 and onry 1r.3 milrion tonnes in 1990. rn other words,
EC oil imports from rran dropped to one third of the previous
volume after the Islamic revolutionaries seized power in Iran.
Whereas in L977 l6.IE of all the ECrs oil imports came from lran,
this percentage had dropped to about 2.42 in f980. In conclusion,
it can be said that it v/as not the trade embargo launched by the US
and supported by the European community and certain other
countries which caused the rranian readership to release the
American hostages. A combination of internal political developments
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i-n lran, the war with Iraq and the agreement reached with the
US over the release of frozen Iranian assets eventually led
Lo the hosLages being releaseri early in 198I. It becomes apparent
how greatly American humiliation over the hostage-taking was
outweighed by America's economic interesL in trade with Iran when
it is seen that, in the course of that same year of 1981 US
grain deliveries to Iran totalled US$ 300 miIl,ion.
e) Ibe-sEels-eBDetee-]Epe:e9-Ev-!!e-q9-98-!be-9998
after the invqg!99_eI_$IgbCgtgle!
33. On 27 December L979 Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan.
The American reaction followed on 4 January 1980, when President
Carter ordered a ban on all deliveries of agricultural products
to the USSR. This ban did not, hovrever, cover the 8 million
tonnes of grain which the US was due to deliver to Russia in
accordance with a contract concluded on 20 January L975" The
ban affected a total of L7 million tonnes of grain and 1.3
million tonnes of soya beans, contracts for which had mostly
already been agreed. The American grain embargo therefore
extended to current contractual agreements. On 8 January
1980, President Carter ordered a revj,ew of the controls on
the export of technologically and strategically irnportant products.
The aim was to investigate the extent to which American exports
were contributing to the military potential of the USSR.
On L2 January, representatives of the US, Argentina, Australia,
Canada and the EC met to discuss cooperating in the grain embargo
imposed on the USSR. .The EC, Australia and Canada agreed not to
make up for lost American exports by increasing their own exports.
Argentina refused to give any such undertaking. Argentina has
since increased its grain exports to the USSR considerabJ-y
and has even concluded long-term export agreements.
Australia's qrain exports also increased substantially
althottglt mainly because Australia was obliged to fulfill contractual
commitments entered into before the embargo was imposed. Canada
also practically doubled its overseas grain deliveries compared
with L978/L979t although ttre leveI remained below that of 1975.
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The European Community adhcred fairly closely to its undertaking
not to undermine the embargo, but to maint.ain its export,s at
around their customary level. It should be borne in mind
that the volume of EC grain exports to the USSR. has rrever beest
particularly great. Moreover, 6s early as January X980 the tsC
stopped subsidizinE agricultural export.s to EasLern bloc countries,
resuming thern later only at a ievel corresponding to export,s in
previous years. On the oLher hand, the EC sharply increased its
exports of soya flour and sugar to the USSR.
34. Even the US exporterC considerably more grain to t.he IrSSR
in L979/L98A (a total of 15.3 million'Eonnes) than in the previous
year (11.2 million tonnes)" However, the US did not exceed the
stated limit of B million tonnes after I April 1980"
The grain embargo was stronEl-y opposed by the US aEricultural
Iobby, in spite of various rel-ief measures introduced by tshe
Carter Administration. During the presidential eLection
campaign, the Republican candidate, now President Reagan, pnomised
l:hat he would lift the embargo if he lvas elect.ed" He did so on
10 April I98I, although meanwhile events in Poland anel t,he threat
of a Sovret invasion of that country had begun to raise Ehe
possibility sf a further grain embargo being imposed on the USSR"
35. The effect.s and consequences of this grain ernbargo varied
greatly. The US, for example, had to spend about US$ I,000
million to buy up its own grain surpluses, step up the production
of alcohol from grain, and thus stabilize the domestic price of,
grain.
The EC's Iosses were much smaller. Probl-ems only really
arose nhen, shortly before the embarEo was lifted, France tried
to dispose of it.s surpluses before the next harvest by selling
500,000 tonnes of wheat to the USSR.
36. The grain embargo i.mposed on the USSR in response to its I
invasion of Afghanistan was not a great success" I{ot only did
the USSR have considerable strategic reserves, i-'f was al-so
able to buy the quantities of grain whi-ch the US refused to
supply from other countries - mainly Argent,ina, but al-so Australia
and Canada. The USSRns actual import shortfall is est,imated at
about 2.5 million tonnes. Short-term probiems arose onj,y j-rr
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connection with feed grain. The following figures give a
cLear indication of the position of the soviet grain market;
the USSR's grain production amounted to:
L978 237.2 million tonnes
L979 L79 ' ',
1980 L89.2 ,' !r
19 8I L82 !' e,
These figures show that the last three years, but particularly
1981, resulted in bad grain harvests for the USSR and produced high
import requirements. The USSR imported the foLlowing quantities
of grain in these four y""r= r 1
L97 I
t97 9
r980
19 81
18.9 million tonnes
15.6 r ,'
3I :r 3r
34.5 ', 8'
37. The only really telling effect of this grain embargo for the
ussR was the higher price to be paid for imports from third
countries " It is estimated that the additional cost of these
irnports amounted to about US$ 1,000 million.
f ) The COCOII Lists
38" Trade in so-carled strategic technorogy prays a special role.
Because of the strict confidentiality of the ,cocoM rists'(consurtative Group coordinating committee, i.e. coordinating
committee for East-west rrade eoricy), it is not possible to
ascertain the exact volume of trade which the Western industrialized
nations forego by preventing exports of strategicar technology
to Warsaw Pact countries. It seems, however, that this ban affects
only a fairly small proportion of potential industrial exports. It
appears unlikely, in any event, that t,he USSR wouLd be major
market for such products.
1
'source: Toepfer rnternational, Statistische Informationen zumGet.reide- und Futtermittelmarkt(Statistical Information relatingto the grain and feedstuffs market ) .
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39. Since the EC countries were unwilling to agree to extend the
embargo on technology over and above the COCOM-Iists, it is
probable that the US has lost part of its share of the
market in this sector t.o other western exporting countries.
The 1980 figures for the export of industriar goods to the ussR
from the us show a marked farr compared to 1979. rn 1979 the
US exported industrial products to the value of uS$ 556 milLion,
whereas in 1980 it exported onry us$ 424 millions'worth. rn the
same period, US exports of machines and motor vehicles dropped
from US$ 352 million to US$ 269 milLion.
40. At the so-cal}ed World Economic Summit in Ottawa in JuIy
198I, the prime ministers or heads of state of the seven main
industrial- nations agreed to a review of the catalogue of exports
covered by the COCOM lists. Talks on this subject were held in
Paris in January L982" These talks were particularly topical
because they included discussions on the posibitity of imposing
economic sanctions on the USSR and Poland in response to the
declaration of martial law by the PoIish military government.
Although the results of this conference have not yet been
published, it seems that the participating states agreed on
tighter export controls for strategically important material
of this kind. The conditions under which such products may
be exported are also to be more stringent in the future. It
does not seem that the participants agreed to an extension of the
COCO}I lists or to a clearer distinction being made between
militarily sensitive exports and ordinary goodsr 6ts some states
wished.
41. A recent study by the Rand Corporation for the US Defence
Department states that Soviet imports of technology do not enable
the Soviets to overcome dependence; but may actually increase it.
It therefore advocates removal of non-essential restraints on
US exports. The inabiliLy of the Soviet Union to encourage
innovation and to make use of high technology throughout its
economy, which lies at the root of the need to import industrial
goods, has much to do with the nature of its economic system.
As a result Soviet imports of industrial goods have been growing
rather rapidly and t':f f er an important market to Western exporters.
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However, any ban on high-technology exports from the us or other
countries seems to be of rather Iow importance for the Soviet
economy as a whole at present, since most of the items it requires
are still readily available from many sources.
In any case it is unlikely that even with a ban on imports
such as those necessary for constructing piperines any chanEe in
soviet policy with regard to Afghanist,an wourd have occurred.
Apart from the impact of a boycott, there remains the more
generar issue of developing trade with a potential enemy. The
US Administration tends to take the view that exports of Western
industriar goods should be restricted because they strengthen
the Soviet economy and therefore its milit.ary capacit,y. In
Europe there is more emphasis on the beneficial effects of trade
with t,he Soviet [Jnion in terms of increased interdependence and
reduced tensions.
s ) qgsg!1988-]Epggs4-gt South Africa.
42 " For many decades now, the governments and parliaments of the
world hat,e been engaged in a keen debate on how to counter
apartheid in South Africa. The repressive policy of the
R.epublic j-s root.ed in unprecedentedly strong racism which dj-sregards
el-ementary human rights. The leading nations of the west have
made numerous attempts to impose economic and military sanctionsj-n order to bring south Africa to ehange this policy, but so far
without success. The united Nations has how decrared Lgg2
the year of sanctions against South Africa. The intention is to
force the country to give up its apartheid poricy. whenever
such attempts have been made in the past, third countries have
very soon proved only too will-ing to benefit from the situation,
for exampre by increasing their arms sales to south Africa.
south Africa wourd be very vurnerable to an arms embargo. For
this reason, whenever such moves have been threatened by foreign
powers in the past, South African arms buyers have stockpiled arms
and spare parts, buying from any supprier who courd provide
suitable material.
43- rn recent years, however, South Africa has succeeded in building
up its own arms industry, and thus becoming ress dependent on
imports.
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An oiI embargo would probably also have considerable impact "
But such a measure would also be pointless unless a sufficient
number of major countries took part'
44. The UN Security Council has passed Resolutions calling for
political as welI as economic measures to end apartheid policy'
The increasing pressure to which South Africa has been subjected
in the uN as a result of its apartheid policy has led to several
security council Resolutions. After the disturbances of March
1960 a Security council decision was passed in the following April
in which the south African government's policy was 'regretted" but
not, however, condemned. The security council emphatically
demanded an end to racial discrimination. A proposal by the
Afro-Asian group, calIing for the expulsion of south Africa from
the uN and the breaking -off of diplomatic and economic relations
with that country, was not adopted: the US and Western European
countries voted against it. In L964, the UN General Assembiy
set up a commission of Inquiry consisting of rePresentatives
of sweden, Britain, Ghana and Morocco. But south Africa refused
the Commission permission to enter the countrY, claiming that this
was interference in domestic affairs. A resolution calling on
Member states of the uN to break off existing cultural agreements
with South Africa and to introduce a visa requirement fot South
African visitors, ancl the other calling on the uN special commission
against Apartheid to organize, in cooperation with the organization
of African unity, &o international conference on sanctions against
south Africa were only partially supported by the member states'
since then, south Africa has regularly almost every year
been condemned by the General Assembly of the uN. The most
recent move by the UN has been the designation of L982 as the year
of sanctions against south Africa and hence as the year of campaign
against aPartheid PolicY-
4:,. It appears doubtful, however, whether this new measure will
be more successlul than those taken in previous years. Economic
s;rnc:Lions woulcl have an enormous impact on south Africa's
1r:i<llrbours, whictr are economically dependent on her" Botswana,
Lcsotho, MaIawi, swaziland and zimbabwe have therefore frequently
expressed reservations in the General Assembly of the UN about
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.iny resoluLion imposing sanctions. Comprehensive economj.c
s.rntlt ions against South Af rica would also rnvolve problems f or
the European Community because of its dependence on several
Souttr African raw materials. Germany o for exanrple, derives one
third of its chromium and uranium ore, and as much as half of
its unrefined copper from South Africa. Economic links with
South Africa are, moreover, very numerous. The EC's foreign
trade with South Africa amounts to about US$ 10,000 million per
year. There are about a thousand firms and subsidiaries in
which European companies hold an interest operating in South
Africai 608 of all foreign investment comes from European countries.
Givcn the rising unemployment figures in the Community, many
frrms, but also many qovernments, would undoubtedly do anything to
prcventt ot at least sidestep, economic sanctions. The evasion
of the Rhodesian sanctions provides many examples of such
behaviour 
"
41;. Consistently applicd sanctions wouldr or the other hand,
lr;1vg considerable ef fects on South Africa, since 54t of the
count::y's gross national product derives from imports and exports.
l.lir(:mployment would rise, particularly among the Black population.
Repercussions would be fert by south Africa's neighbours, which
as nrentioned above, are closely connected with the Repub1ic, and
iir'(\ clependent cn imports from that country" About 50,000 migrant
\t',1-|igps from these neighbouring states work in south Africa.
rjouLh Africa could seriously affect her neighbours to the north
I,y taking retariatory measures, since these countries are not
onry reliant on trade with south Africa, but arso need south
African ports for their exports. The European community could
;r1:;o be af fected by retaliatory action by South Africa. A
('()nsiderable proportion of the EC's principar imports of raw
mater.ials comes from south Africa. The EC imports 8oa of its
Pl.rl inum, 908 of its manganese, 9rt of its chromjum ore and
3(,1 o[ its vanadium from South Africa. Even if it were possible
Lo .rchieve almost universal agreement at international leveI
and l() imprement effective dipromatic, military, economic,
r-rrl lrrral, academic and sports sanctions against south Africa,
liLr(.'(:(isr; wourd not necessarily be assured, ds experience has shown
in connection with many other similar measures.
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47 - But even without imposing sanctions, the European Communj-ty
coul.cl tnakc a considerable contribution to the elimination of
racjal discrimination by compelling firms which have lnvested in
South Africa or hold a major interest in South African companies
to compry with the EC code of conduct" These firms courd set a
good example by abolishing racial discrimination for their own
employees by paying them arr the same wage rates and above arr
by actively endeavouring to improve the rights of workers who are
the victims of apartheid policy.
h) Sancti-ons 3s3- ! 
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48. rn the night of 12 13 December r9gr, the military author-
ities took over the government in Poland, the activities of the
free trade union 'Sol5-darity' were banned and a state of emergency
declared in the whole country which is still being maj-ntained in
many areas.
The Community is following developments in poland with close
attention and concern. The Community initially adopted a wait-and-
see approach to economic sanctions. On 4 January L982, the Council
of Foreign lulinisters issued a communiqu6 condemning the events in
Poland as a violation of the Final Act of Helsinki and demanding
an end to martial Iaw, the release of those arrested and genuine
consultation by the Government with the Church and the Solidarity
trade union. The communiqu6 also noted that the USA had announced
economic sanctions and warned of the possibirity of measures by
the community against poland and the ussR depending on how the
situation developed.
49. As events in porand stirl have not changed for the better
owing to soviet pressure, the council, acting on proposals from
the Commission, decided on 15 March L982 on the following economic
sanctions against the USSR:
restrictions on approximately 58 categories
consumer goods and capital goods;
a 25E reduction in imports of such goods on
figures;
of goods, including
the basis of 1980
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an 'ad hoc' arrangement to be made
has refused to implement sanctions;
in the case of Greece, which
these sanctions to remain in force from 16 March to 31
L982.
December
50. When assessing these measures by the Community, it is essentia
to bear in mind experience to date with sanctions of this kind.
Even if the Council and Commission are not considering general
economic sanctions but specific selective measures, these too shoul
be governed by paragraph 3 of Parliament's motion for a resolution.
ttrasty and ill-considered measures against Poland and the USSR. could
have far more serious economic and political economic repercussions
on Europe thah the present coercion of Po1and to confirm the
European balance of power established at the end of the Second
World War"
IV. Economic sanctions over the last feW-deqades:
the lessons to be drawn
51. Economic sanctions have practically never achieved their
objective of forcing a political opPonent to take or refrain
from a certain action and thereby bri.ng about a change in policy"
The reasons for this failure are many and various, and are the
fault both. of the state or states imposing sanctions, and the
state or states subjected to them. The following reasons for
failure l,ie with the countries imposing sanctions:
(a) lgg_Iggg-C_9glgy between the decision to impose sanction
and their entry into effect. This delay is occasioned
by the time required t,o make t,he necessary legal'and :
admini.strative arrangements; embargo lists have to.
be drawn up, and terms-such as the concept of a
'strategically important product' have to be def,ined.
Thus the 'victimn has time to prepare for sanctions"
He can build up reserve stocks, make available stocks
last longer and conelude alternati're contracts with othe
states. It is this possibility of 'roundaboutn imports
which often makes it easier for him to tolerate or
overcome the effects of sanctions;
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(b) s_lcs!-g!_ggligerlly berween rhinvorved in ;;;-i;o.sirion or 
":"::i::l:"1":":.H;of adeguate cooperation in their implementation.Cooperation between all the partners rs, however,
" 
necessary if sanctions are to be effective" Itpresupposes mutuaL trust, agreement on the politicalobjective to be attainedr d'd readiness, if ne,d be,
;:r::::, "t"o" 
to esuarize rire burdens borne by each
(c) rbe-3E99!99-ef-!!e-re=e99e.v-sg!ger_sgpp95! 
amons the
. 
states imposing sanctions is yet another cause of thefailure of such sanctions 
' Burdens are not distributedequarry among the states imposing sanctions and hencethe costs and damage incurred vary from one partner toanother according to the vorume of Erade invorved"rf no attempt is made to share the economic burdenaccordingly the most seriousry affected states becomecorrespondingly r'ess eager to participate fully insanctions;
(d; *'1c,e is often yery_g!5g!g_gEpg'i!rel_i5gg_pg!1r_gggggE
gflgglggly--tJL._sg!!lg!! 
" Traditional markets arelost to competitors; current trade relations areinterrupted. Even parties not involved in the dispute,such as shipping and trading companiesr 
€lr€ affected bysanctions to some extent. This often results inconsiderabre l0sses in income for the persons or businessesconcerned- rf the state makes good such l0sses frompublic money the financiar consequences of sanctions wirlbe felt by the whole country.(e) these conseguences of sanctions cause those affected bythem to seize every conceivable opportunity to sidesteoEg!g!19!9, and thus reduce the impact ;;-;;.;"_::::;;==.ontheir own business activiries. ro.-r]1.;;;.,.;=;radinsdirectly with the state on which sanctions have been imposed,trade is channelled through neutral countries, orrr€itThborrr'1ng couniries become rnvorvcd. This methodof sidestepprng sanctions can onry be prevented if third
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countries are prepared to say that they will not allow
the re-export of goods into the country on which sanctions
have been imposed, and that they will not increase the
volume of their trade beyond usual previous leve1s"
In cases where the rules are broken in this wdlr the
extension of the embargo to third countries may be
considered" This is not always possible, however;
(f) the failure of sanctions is often due to the lgg\-g!
eqgggetg_Egq!E-9I_pglfgf!g-!beg. It is not practicable,
in peace time, to subject Land and sea communications to control
by military forces in the manner of a blockade" Attempts
to create an international booy to exercise the requisite
supervision of trade often come to nothing because of
the Eime taken to set such machinery up. The only
effective method of controL up to now has proved to be
the exercise of seLf-restraint by the exporting companies
themselves " But even this form of control can be
undermined, if subsidiaries of the same company are
set up under different names in different, countries
and products are sold under other brand names in other
countries " In this way trade channels can be altered
to such an extent that in pract,ice it is no longer
possible to police the implementation of the sanctions
which have been imposed;
(g) a decisive factor for the success or failure of sanctions
is the 9r!9!!-9!-!b9-!359e!-9999!5v:g-99P9!ge!9e-9!-!be
IBpgE!9_l!y91ygg" For example, Iran was dependent to a
high degree on the import of basic foodstuffs (252),
raw materials and semi-finished goods in the metal-
working industry (808), the construction industry,
r 57t ) , the paper i-rdustry t 50t ) and the chenrcal and
pharmaceutical industry (85t)" Even before the trade
embargo was imposed on Iran, the country's foreign trade
had dropped sharply because of the confused political
situation. Imports were almost entirely restricted to
replacement parts and foodstuffs.
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As a consequence of these devel0pments there was a markerincrease in the under-utilization of production capaeityin many rndustriar sectors in rran which depended on theimport of raw materials and semi-finished goods. The
embargo exacerbated t,his situation but did not
materiarr-y change it. The embargo did not produce
any political results.
Bsesges-!er-!be 
- 
Iei lgre 
-e5- sssetleEs-sbigb-beye- tbs rr-erigiss
rE-lhe-g3Ese!_seettsY .
(a) The states against which economic sanctions aredirecred often have esple_!lBe_lg_3gept_!9_ggg!gglgllggg since considerabte periods generally
eLapse between Ehe official poriticar announcement
and the entry ..;.nto force of sanctions. ,Targeto
countries can buird up stocks and reserves in goodtime; they can also secure their suprplies by
entering into contracts with exporting countries
which are not parties to the sanctions;
(b) the eff,ectiveness of economic sanctions depends onthe exisrence nor only of a gglflgleg$y_lgfgg
ve]ese-e!-!segse 
-psg_etee_eE_3_sg!slglentIy_usb
9egree_g€_geBeegglge_9!_1sp9r!E. such dependence
can be reduced by the target state taking certaindomestic measures. These j.nch-lde for example,
measures to increase industrialization, the
restructuring of industrial production, the
stepping-up of aEriculturaL production and thedeliberate reduction of the consumption of importedgoods by rationing and other means;
(c) releJlgtgry_:elgl]glg by the rarget srate ean be
very effective, particularry as a means of destroying
solidarity among its opponents. The supply of
importan t and scarce raw materiars to the worrd market
can be disrupted, for example, if the country on which
sanctions have been imposed plays a large part inthe production of such commodities. This can resurt
52"
G
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in'trade relations being maintained, directly or
by subterfuge, in spite of sanctions" In tnis way
the target country is able t,o procure the foreign
curreney it requires in order t,o pay for urgently
needed i.mports such as spare parts and other ernbargoed
products.
2" Economic and pe] I!lssI 
-seeeegsegsee_eE_sgnsglgt s
53" Although sanctions do not as a rule achieve their political
objective and are EeneralJ.y i-neff,ective for the reasons outlined
above, they can nevertheless produce siEnificant economic and
poriticaL changes. patterns of trade are disruptedn and the
pattern of dernand in the aff,ect:ed state changes as a result of the
state0s j.ncreased self-suffici-ency and the replacement of embargoed
imports by substitute products, The chronic shortages produced
by sanctions often produce a surge of soi-idarity among the peopre
of the affected state in support of t,heir country and their
government,. This rnotivates the population to make great, efforts
to reprace i.mported products by other goods and aLternative
methods 
"
This Process eventually leads to the permanent. Ioss of the
market and eriminates the country's previous dependence on imports"
Looked at from this point of view, sanct,ions can arso i-ead to a
strengthening of the economic and political position of the country
on which they are imposed, and hence achieve the opposite resurt
to that intended, the weakening of the target country.
54 - sanctions also often have the eff,ect of making the target countrfeer increasingly threatened. This heightens existing tensions"
rmposing an embargo can arso read to unforeseen changes in the
adversary ' s o,t rook " For exampJ.e , the ussR , s grow5.ng dependence
on imported oil has increased her int.erest in exercising influence
in the oPEc countries, panticularly the Middre East, and hence
contributed to the increase of tensions between the super powers
in this area.
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55" In real political terms, economic sanct.ions often represent
no more than a ritual gesture devoid of serious consequences, This
can weaken the political. credibilit,y of the countries rmposing
sanctions and in the long run place an intolerable strain on
solidarity and cooperation between them" It also becomes apparent
that thc emotionaL connotations of economic sanctions are generally
more powerful t.han t.herr econonric ef fects.
The imposition of sanctions is seen to be an end in itself,
an act taken to meet the publicos expect.ations" Their efficiency
in political ternns is often due to the fact that the target state
interprets sanctions as a political gesture, and is restrained
from pursuing certain poj.it.ical actions" The economic consequences
of the sanctions i.mposed on the ussR were negligible"
Admittedly, t.he fact that Erain imports became motre expensive
and difficult to obtain exacerbated the problems of Soviet
ag;-icult.ure and had reperc!,lssions on Iivestock rearing, but, the
impact of sanctrons was nclt srrch as to cornpel tne artthorltres to
chanqc' rheir pol ieY.
56, Nor was this ef fect. achieved by t.ne list.s drawn up by COCOII
i.,-r the Cotd war years, i-950-l-955, imposing an embargo on strategically
5.mportant products " This ernerges clearly f,rom Lhe f,ollowing
f igures, which show the expansion of ehe USSRns major indus'cries
over that periodr:
1950 1965
Elecericity generation
pig iron
raw steel
rolled steel
oiL pipeLines ( in t.housanCs
of kms )
gas pipeLines ( in t.housands
of kms )
9L,200 m" kwh 506,600 rn" kr,uh
L9r l m. tonnes 66,L m. tonnes
27 ,3 m. t,onnes 91 , 0 m . tonnes
L7r9 rn, tonnes 6L,6 m" t-onnes
5,4 m" tonnes 28u2 m" Lonnes
203 m" tonnes 4I,8 m. tonnes
57.. The European Comrnuniey is considerably more dependent on imports
and exports, and hence on the maintenance of foreign Lrade, than
'Sou".*: The Soviet Economy, 1980n p" 40
-37 PE 77 -096/fin"
the us or the ussR" Any disruption of this trade, and consequently
any form of economic warfare would affect the EC more severely than
+-he two superpowers" Foreign trade and economic processes are
therefore closely bound up wi.tir political developments within the
community" For this reason, the EC wili. have to strengthen poJ.itical
coooperation as a back-up to conunon economic policies if it. is tso
have any hope of taking t,imely and effective actiGn-t.o counter such
threats 
"
3) BeseUrns-p9!9!!ieI-eeeI lse!I9BE_98_egggenlq_EqBq! io4s
58. The arguments outlined above indieate that the vulnerabilj-ty
of a country's economy to sanctions is dependent on the percentage
of that country's requirements met by imports and it.s chanees of
reducing such requirements or switching to alternative commodities 
"It follows that very selective sanetions aimed at particular product.s
can be effective; if onj.y a few countries export the product in
question and they can al-I be relied upon to act in concert"
Highly specialized technoloEy would be a case in point, Et least
in the long term. But, even sor the economic and poli.tieal
consequences of such sanctions need to be considered carefully"
59" sanctions can, moreover, be eff,ecti-ve when they are imposed
by countries which have a monopoi-y on the production of certain
raw materi.aLs" Such sanctions will be successful- if all the
producer countries act in concert, or can be compelLed to do so
it need be" The fewer possibilities the t.arget country has
of fonegoing the embargoed goods or switching to alternative
comm,odities, the more effective such sanctions wirl be.
60" Sanations aimed at. Lhe money and loan rnarket or even the
gold and diamond market can arso produce results if t,he state
on which they are imposed is dependent, on internationar roans
for its economy and trade. Measures whieh coul.d be effective
in the context of a serective embargo of t,his kind inctude
restrictinq or compretely freezinq curreney movement,s, limiting
or prohibiting the supply of credit, and also refusing to guaran.bee
J.oans advanced by private banks and brocking sares of gold and
diamonds for thard' currencies. The US and the EC are particularly
werl-pi'aced to enforce measures of Ehis kind because of, their ceneral
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rcle on the world currency and gold markets" But, here again,
it must not be overlooked that t,here are means of circumventing
such measures, and that. these loopholes cannot be entirely closed.
6I" The essential precondition for any deEree of success for
economic sanctions is total agreement among those imposing
sanctions on the political objective in view, and absolute mutual
t,rust. This implies that the states involved must be prepared to
inform each other, reciprocaJ.ly and in good timer prior to any
steps they intend t,o take and t.hat. the parties to sanctions
should not be conf,ronted with 'faits accompJ,iso and then required
to support them out of so1idarit,Y"
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